

ALGERIA

1. PRESENTATION¹

Basic Facts: ²	
Name of Country	People's Democratic Republic of Algeria (Algeria)
Capital	Algiers
Population	32,930,091 (July 2006 est.)
Area	2,381,740 sq km
Average Life Expectancy	73.26 years
Ethnic Groups	Arab-Berber 99%, European less than 1% note: though nearly all Algerians are Berber in origin, only a minority of 15-20% continue to identify themselves primarily as such
GDP per Capita (PPP)	\$7,200 (2005 est.)

Community of Democracies	
Previous Participation	Warsaw: Participant Seoul: Observer Santiago: Observer

Timeline of Recent Major Events in Algeria

- **1992** - Cancellation of parliamentary elections; commencement of civil war.
- **1999** - Election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika as President; promulgation of “civil harmony” law.
- **2002** - Parliamentary elections.
- **2004** - Bouteflika re-elected president with 85% of vote in a contest deemed free and fair by international observers.
- **2005** September 29 - Referendum on “Charter for National Peace and Reconciliation” approved in national vote.
- **2006** February 27 - Decree imposing terms of the Charter’s implementation issued.
- **2006** May 24 - Ahmed Ouyahia resigns as prime minister, replaced by Abdelaziz Belkhadem.
- **2006** June 14 - *Le Matin* editor Mohamed Benchicou released from prison after serving full two-year sentence.
- **2006** September – Rabah Kebir, leader of the banned Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), returns from self-imposed exile and urges rebels still fighting the state to disarm.

¹ Principal Author: Freedom House

² Source: CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ag.html>, accessed 31 July 2006.

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2. BACKGROUND

Algeria's long anticolonial struggle culminated in an eight-year-long war of independence (1954–62) that ended 132 years of French colonial rule. In 1965, the military overthrew the country's first president, Ahmed Ben Bella, and installed Houari Boumediene. The military has dominated Algerian politics ever since, with the National Liberation Front (FLN) as the only legal party until it permitted the formation of independent political parties in 1989. By 1992 the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a fundamentalist party, was positioned to win national elections. This situation led the army to cancel the vote and ban the FIS, triggering the start of a bloody civil war between armed groups of Islamist extremists and the government that has claimed up to 200,000 lives.³

A presidential election held in 1999 was severely flawed. Citing government fraud and manipulation, six opposition candidates withdrew, leaving former foreign minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika to run unopposed. After Bouteflika took office, the government introduced a "civil harmony" law that granted amnesty to thousands of Islamist rebels who renounced violence, though the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) continued operations, killing thousands in 2003.⁴ The attacks subsequently diminished significantly, but clashes with security forces and ambushes against civilians continue. In 2006, the Ministry of the Interior claimed that about 800 insurgents are still active.⁵

The country held elections again in April 2004, and the incumbent Bouteflika won a landslide victory against five challengers in a process that international observers pronounced generally free and fair. In the wake of his re-election, Bouteflika seemed to take steps to reinforce his strength in the small circle of powerful generals. He reshuffled senior military positions and, in August 2004, accepted the resignation for health reasons of the army chief, General Mohammed Lamari, long at the center of the war against the Islamists.⁶

Since the Santiago Ministerial in April 2005 there have been several important developments affecting Algeria's democratic credentials. The key post-Santiago event was the referendum of 29 September 2005 in which an overwhelming majority of voters approved the government's proposed Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, an amnesty bill which would allow for the rehabilitation of all actors from the civil war not involved in "massacres, rape, or the use of explosives in public places."⁷ Some human rights groups immediately decried the bill and contended that it amounted to "a denial of

³ "Algeria: 200,000 Dead and 500 000 Arrests Later..." *Algeria-Watch*, April 2005, http://www.algeria-watch.org/en/aw/200000_dead.htm, accessed 31 July 2006.

⁴ Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2005* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005).

⁵ "Country Report: Algeria", (London: *Economist Intelligence Unit* [EIU], June 2006), www.eiu.com.

⁶ *Freedom in the World 2005*.

⁷ "Still not out of the woods" *New Zealand Herald*, 3.11.06, accessed through Nexis 7/26/2006.

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truth and justice to the victims of the abuses and their families.”⁸ The charter’s terms were announced in a decree by President Bouteflika on February 27 and included wide-ranging amnesty provisions.⁹ The six-month period during which fighters are eligible for amnesty ran until 31 August 2006¹⁰, after which time the government faces a major test in terms of its strategy toward the armed groups who refuse to turn in their weapons. Many observers believe that the real point of the charter is to ensure that military and security forces will not face charges for the numerous atrocities they are alleged to have carried out. According to this view, the charter is the military’s end of a deal in which President Bouteflika is allowed to re-assert civilian primacy in government.¹¹

On May 24, 2006 President Bouteflika accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia and appointed a close ally, Abdelaziz Belkhadem, as his replacement.¹² The move came in the wake of constitutional reform proposals, the most significant of which would allow presidents to serve past the previous limit of two terms. Bouteflika has proposed a referendum to approve his proposed changes, which remain vague but would include a shift in the balance of powers between the executive and legislative branches, possibly by replacing the position of prime minister with that of a vice-president.¹³

3. ANALYSIS

Elections and Democratic Participation

The dominance of the executive branch, strongly backed by the military, remains problematic. While the 2004 presidential election represented a clear improvement from 1999, Bouteflika enjoyed both the military’s strong backing and a significant media advantage derived from control of the country’s state-owned airwaves.¹⁴ Furthermore, the government hindered the efforts of opposition candidates by tying up their finances, challenging their signatures on petitions, and denying them media coverage. Former prime minister and FLN leader Ali Benflis was forced to run as an independent, and many potential candidates were prevented from running altogether. Several candidates, including former Prime Minister Mouloud Hamrouche, withdrew their candidacies in protest against these practices.¹⁵

⁸ “Algeria: New Amnesty Law Will Ensure Atrocities Go Unpunished” (New York: *International Center for Transitional Justice* [ICTJ], 1 March 2006), <http://www.ictj.org/en/news/press/release/881.html>, accessed 7/26/06.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ “Algeria: Country Rising From Ashes of Civil Conflict” *The Nation* (Kenya), 5/12/2006, accessed through Nexis 7/26/2006.

¹¹ “A flawed charter” *The Economist*, 10.8.05, accessed through Nexis 7/26/2006.

¹² Mr. Belkhadem is the secretary-general of Algeria’s largest political party, the National Liberation Front (FLN). Heba Saleh, “Algerian president replaces prime minister with close ally” *Financial Times*, 5/26/2006, accessed through Nexis 7/26/2006.

¹³ “Algeria’s new constitution project: Between debate and apathy,” *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, 7/13/06, accessed through Nexis 7/26/2006.

¹⁴ Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2006* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).

¹⁵ Freedom House, *Countries at the Crossroads 2005* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005)

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The most recent parliamentary elections, in May 2002, witnessed the lowest turnout in Algerian history as well as accusations of fraud. The opposition also noted a large discrepancy between the number of valid votes for independents and small parties initially announced by the interior minister and the number later confirmed by the Constitutional Council. In the end, the FLN won 199 seats in the 389-seat National Assembly.¹⁶ The next parliamentary elections, scheduled for 2007, will likely see continued dominance by the three main allied parties (FLN, RND, MSP) as well as continued government interference in the electoral process.

While there are multiple political parties in the country, they are subject to restrictions. A 1997 law forbids political parties from being formed on the basis of religion, ethnicity, gender, and regionalism. Parties may not participate in elections unless they are granted legal status by the Ministry of the Interior, who determines whether a party's platform and membership, among other things, are consistent with requirements in the 1997 law. A loose alliance of the FLN, the military-backed National Democratic Rally (RND), and the moderate Islamist Movement of Society for Peace (MSP) has existed since 1997. The government refuses to formally authorize the Movement for Fidelity and Justice (Wafa), which is viewed as the FIS' political heir, and the secular Democratic Front.¹⁷ Thus, both these parties have difficulty opening bank accounts, renting space, and recruiting staff. There do not appear to be any plans to reincorporate the FIS into political society.¹⁸

Rule of Law and Adherence to Constitution

One major constraint on Algerian adherence to the rule of law is the lack of an independent judiciary. Algeria's judiciary is not independent from the executive. The Supreme Judicial Council (CSM), headed by the president, is constitutionally responsible for assigning, promoting, and transferring judges.¹⁹ In practice, the ministry of justice plays a leading role in determining the career paths of judges. Thus, judges, prosecutors, and magistrates are averse to making judicial decisions contrary to government expectations for fear of imperiling their careers.²⁰

The judiciary's serious deficiencies weaken the rule of law. Public perception of corruption and bribery in the judicial system is widespread. Judges often overlook abuses committed by police and prosecutors, allowing them to indulge in extended pretrial detention, summary investigations, and even torture without repercussion. Training is inadequate, resources are scarce and caseloads overwhelming.²¹ Lack of adherence to the constitution is particularly notable in the case of the behavior of the security forces. Extra-constitutional detainment and human rights violations (discussed below) occur

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ "Algeria: Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004" U.S. Department of State, 2/28/2005, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41718.htm>, accessed 7/31/2006.

¹⁸ *Countries at the Crossroads 2005*.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Kareem Elbayar, "Selected NGO Laws in Arab States" Washington, DC: *International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law* Vol. 7:4, p. 3, <http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/pubs/ArabStates.pdf>, accessed 7/31/2006.

²¹ *Countries at the Crossroads 2005*.

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regularly and in direct contravention of both the Algerian constitution and international law. Amnesty International issued a report in July 2006 noting multiple instances in which national laws were ignored, particularly laws related to judicial processes such as extended pretrial detention, incommunicado detention, lack of access to counsel, and lack of judicial intervention to stop these and other due process and human rights violations.²²

Separation of Powers

The executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government do not practice effective oversight of one another. The bicameral legislative branch does little to hold the executive accountable. The lower body, the National Assembly, has the power to pass laws, but three-fourths of the members of the upper body, the National Council, must approve each bill before it can take effect. The National Council is not a purely democratic body; of its 144 seats, 96 are chosen through indirect elections by local assemblies within each of the country's 48 provinces (*wilayas*), while the other 48 members are appointed by the president. In the most recent indirect elections, the National Democratic Rally won 82 percent of the 96 seats, while the opposition FLN won 13 percent, demonstrating that opposition parties are effectively shut out of the upper house. There are elected local governments, but they possess little power in comparison to *walis* (prefects) appointed by the national executive.²³ There is some speculation that President Bouteflika will include a strengthening of the upper chamber as part of the proposed constitutional reform.²⁴

Military Accountability

The military, though increasingly relegated to the background, retains an abundance of power in Algerian affairs. Current and retired officers—often referred to as *le pouvoir*—remain important decision makers. However, General Muhammad Lamari—a coup ringleader and army chief of staff since 1993—resigned in July 2004, an important symbolic move that observers believe may further reassert Bouteflika's control over the largely autonomous military.²⁵

Despite steps toward greater civilian control, the Algerian military is widely assumed to wield ultimate veto power over the democratic opening. The reassertion of the civilian-led government of President Bouteflika may make holding military leaders accountable more difficult if it is indeed true that a deal, implicit or explicit, has been made in which the security forces relinquish their tight reins on government in exchange for protection from investigation or prosecution related to wartime actions.

²² “Unrestrained powers: Torture by Algeria’s Military Security,” (London: *Amnesty International* [AI] 10 July 2006), <http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE280042006?open&of=ENG-2MD>, accessed 7/26/2006.

²³ *Countries at the Crossroads 2005*.

²⁴ “Algeria’s new constitution project: Between debate and apathy” (BBC Monitoring Middle East).

²⁵ *Ibid.*

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The government claims that the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation will allow the country to move past the wounds of the 1990s. However, according to political opposition groups and human rights advocates, the amnesty has little chance of achieving actual reconciliation. Several prominent human rights groups issued a joint statement asserting that under the charter's terms both military forces and state-sponsored paramilitaries will never face any consequences for massacres and disappearances.²⁶ Furthermore, the criteria for determining which militants may benefit from the amnesty are vague, and the aftermath of the 1999 Civil Harmony Law inspires little confidence in the vigor of the screening system. A provision for compensating the families of the disappeared was included, but few families wish to accept a death certificate and payment in lieu of discovering the truth about the exact fate of their loved ones.²⁷ Finally, the inclusion of Article 46 in the Charter, which criminalizes acts and speech that "weaken the state, or...undermine the good reputation of its agents who honorably served it..." gives the government a powerful tool to suppress further inquiry into the crimes of the conflict.²⁸

Human Rights

Algeria remains a chronic violator of human rights. Though the worst abuses of the 1990s war have abated, the long-standing pattern of infringement upon individual rights shows no sign of imminent disappearance. The behavior of the security forces and the restrictions imposed on the media are of particular concern.

While torture has decreased significantly, it has not ceased completely. The Ministry of Defense's Department of Information and Security (DRS) – also known as Military Security – is the primary agent of torture and extra-legal detention. This group operates outside of the normal system of justice and has its own powers of investigation, arrest, and prosecution. It maintains secret detention facilities and has limited accountability. After the 11 September attacks on the United States, the DRS received a new mandate. Not only does it continue to operate in the domestic realm, but it also receives support from foreign governments in cooperating with regional and global antiterrorism efforts. Given the frequent links between domestic and international militant groups, DRS' new role will likely provide it a *raison d'etre* for the indefinite future.²⁹

Extended pretrial detention continues to be a problem. The code of penal procedure empowers authorities to detain a suspect for up to 48 hours before arraignment by an examining magistrate. Suspected terrorists or subversives can be held in pre-arraignment detention up to 12 days before seeing a magistrate, but some suspects have been held without charge for years.³⁰

²⁶ "Algeria: New Amnesty Law Will Ensure Atrocities Go Unpunished" (ICTJ).

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ "Unrestrained powers: Torture by Algeria's Military Security" (AI).

³⁰ Ibid.

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The constitution states that anyone charged with a crime is presumed innocent until proven guilty. It also recognizes the right of the accused to a lawyer and guarantees access to counsel. However, the right to a fair trial is frequently undermined by the use of confessions under duress to produce convictions. Detainees suspected of serious crimes are routinely denied access to a lawyer, often held incommunicado, and prevented from contacting family members - all in violation of the penal code. Many lawyers are loath to accept cases involving accused terrorists for fear of retribution.³¹ Algeria has shown increased sensitivity with regard to its human rights record, but so long as a culture of impunity exists and the DRS remains largely unaccountable, the episodes of abuse that the amnesty charter seeks to expunge will continue, albeit on a reduced scale.

Freedom of Expression and the Press

The state of emergency - in effect since the 1992 coup - requires political parties and organizations to seek formal authorization to assemble and to stage demonstrations. Authorities regularly refuse to permit demonstrations or meetings without offering justification. There are numerous reports of gendarmes, riot-control police, and security forces using excessive force to break up both legal and unauthorized demonstrations. Public demonstrations in the Algiers region have been banned since 2001. Protesters are regularly detained and then released or sentenced on public order charges. In May 2004, gendarmes put down rioting in the village of T'kout, east of Algiers; some who had demonstrated in support of local autonomy were assaulted or tortured while in custody.³²

The Algerian constitution contains clauses that theoretically protect freedom of expression. In practice, however, repressive laws are used regularly to intimidate and in some cases imprison journalists. Penal code amendments passed in 2001 make it a crime to defame the president, judiciary, armed forces, and Parliament. Given the lack of judicial independence, the government has a high conviction rate in such cases.

Press freedom conditions deteriorated considerably after Bouteflika's reelection; 2005 was an especially bad year for journalists in Algeria, with the government making liberal use of its highly ambiguous defamation laws. Few independent publications escaped legal and administrative harassment. In what was almost a weekly ritual, journalists and editors who crossed certain lines in their coverage were summoned to court to face defamation charges. Authorities also deployed the power of the state-run printing press; with few private newspapers owning their own press, the media are vulnerable to threats or sudden demands for payment by the government.³³

Mohammed Benchicou, publisher of the now defunct French-language daily *Le Matin*, was sentenced to two years in prison in June 2004 for violating currency laws and served his full sentence. Upon his release on 14 June 2006, some organizations took the

³¹ *Countries at the Crossroads 2005*.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Freedom House, *Freedom of the Press 2006* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).

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opportunity to issue reports protesting other examples of harassment of journalists.³⁴ During 2005, several other employees of *Le Matin* and two journalists at *Le Soir D'Algerie*, another daily often critical of Bouteflika, were given prison terms pending appeal. Though Ahmed Benoum, the publisher of *er-Rai*, was acquitted of tax evasion charges, his paper has not been published since 2003.³⁵ Foreign journalists were harassed during the year, and the France-based monthly *Jeune Afrique* and weekly *L'Express* were banned by authorities after reports critical of the government. 2006 has seen some improvement with the release of Benchicou and the 3 July pardon of all journalists with defamation convictions, but some groups are skeptical that the current calm will last in the absence of reform to the defamation laws.³⁶

Women's and Minority Rights

Algerian women continue to face discrimination in several areas. The 1984 family code, based largely on Sharia (Islamic law), places women under the legal guardianship of their husband or male relatives. The code was amended in 2005 to eliminate some of the more onerous clauses, but the legal guardian provision remained, along with the legality of polygamy.³⁷ Additionally, though the government has joined the UN Women's Convention, it has maintained reservations to key articles.³⁸ However, the government has banned sexual harassment, and it commissioned a study on domestic violence which recognized the problem in a frank manner.³⁹

Though Berbers are widely recognized as the ancestors of nearly all Algerians, their cultural, political, and language rights remain the most sensitive minority rights issue in the country. Since 2001, violence has repeatedly occurred in the Kabylie region of the country where most self-identified Berbers live. The constitution was revised in April 2002 to recognize the main Berber language - Tamazight - as a national language. Berbers continue to demand recognition of Tamazight as an official language, which would expand its role in public documents and government institutions. Bouteflika has repeatedly stressed the Berber contribution to Algerian culture; however, many Berbers find his tone condescending and dismissive.⁴⁰ Talks with the government over the issue collapsed in early 2004, and many Berbers boycotted both the presidential election and the 2005 referendum on the amnesty charter. Though Berbers are well-represented in Algerian society, the language issue and question of autonomy for Kabylie will likely continue to simmer.

³⁴ "Algeria: Press Freedom at Risk Despite Release of Editor," (Brussels: *Human Rights Watch* [HRW], 14 June 2006), <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/06/13/algeri13543.htm>, accessed 7/26/2006.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ "Presidential pardon welcomed but need for reforms stressed" (Paris: *Reporters sans Frontieres* [RSF], 7 July 2006), http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=18201, accessed 7/26/2006.

³⁷ Wendy Kristianasen, "Algeria: the women speak" *Le Monde Diplomatique*, April 2006, http://mondediplo.com/2006/04/07algeria?var_recherche=kristianasen, accessed 7/31/2006.

³⁸ "Amnesty International Annual Report 2006" *Amnesty International*, <http://web.amnesty.org/report2006/dza-summary-eng>, accessed 7/26/2006.

³⁹ *Freedom in the World 2006*.

⁴⁰ Mourad Hachid, "Kabylie demonized" *El Watan*, 10/3/05, translation by BBC Monitoring Middle East, accessed through Nexis 7/26/2006.

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4. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Algeria's shortcomings as a democracy are evident and often related to the country's authoritarian past and the conflict of the 1990s. However, while still not free, the country shows signs of a movement toward a democratic opening. Two great challenges remain before the Community of Democracies criteria are fulfilled: broadening the range of political power and improving human rights. Multiple other challenges exist as well, but the absence of efforts to improve on these two overarching themes is likely to prevent Algeria's democratic transition from fully blossoming in the future.

Democratic reform will be a long-term project in Algeria. In the short-term, changes must be made which enable a more open, decentralized form of government, including ceding some executive branch control to the legislative branch, as well as granting the judiciary greater independence and the resources to fulfill its constitutional mandate. In order to move toward greater decentralization, authority at the local (*wilaya*) level should be largely transferred from the executive-appointed *walis* to the elected municipal councils and popular assemblies. At the national legislative level, the National Council should become a directly elected body, while the National Assembly should be empowered to more strongly oversee the executive. Regarding the judiciary, one route toward greater effectiveness is through the CSM. The role of nominating and assigning judges and magistrates should move from the executive to the CSM. The CSM should also be given the necessary financial resources to carry out this transformation and should itself be composed largely of elected magistrates.⁴¹

Other changes must target citizen participation in politics, with a goal of opening the political process to a broad segment of Algerian society. The state of emergency should finally be lifted and freedom of expression encouraged through the lifting of restrictions on political party activity and an easing of the arduous process of party registration. With regard to the press, Algeria will not have a credibly free press until the defamation laws are removed from the books and journalists no longer face the threat of arrest and heavy penalties. The state must also halt its use of economic weapons to inhibit free expression; in particular, capricious conditions imposed on the use of state-owned printing presses should cease immediately.

In the realm of human rights, Algeria must come into compliance with its treaty obligations regarding the treatment of prisoners. Torture and extra-constitutional detention are areas of grave concern. With the recognition that the Algerian military's role in politics remains murky and the civilian government still treads gingerly where the security matters are concerned, the DRS must be brought under control and the culture of impunity among its agents halted immediately. The Amnesty International report of July 2006 suggests a number of steps, both short- and medium-term, to controlling DRS activities.⁴² In the short-term, the Algerian government must make a firm public condemnation of torture and commit to ending it. Agents of the DRS (and other security

⁴¹ *Countries at the Crossroads 2005*.

⁴² "Unrestrained powers: Torture by Algeria's Military Security" (AI).

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agencies) who are accused of committing violations of human rights during arrest or interrogation should be removed from the exercise of those duties until a thorough investigation has been completed. The use of confessions and other statements made under duress should be immediately discontinued, as should incommunicado and extended pretrial detention.

In the medium-term, Algeria must reform its legal and administrative mechanisms to ensure that proper resources are provided for such basic protections as access to counsel and investigation of complaints regarding rights violations. When appropriate, criminal penalties should be issued when procedures are violated, as provided by Article 51 of the Algerian Code of Criminal Procedure.⁴³ The enforcement aspect is crucial, as the Algerian security forces currently operate under an assumption of impunity which will not be broken unless a precedent of strong punishment is established for rights violations.

In the longer-term, Algeria must come to grips with the scars left by the civil war by taking actions to demonstrate a serious reckoning with war's harsh consequences. The amnesty charter should be revisited and refined. While a wide-ranging amnesty can be inevitable or even desirable, more must be done to acknowledge the crimes of the conflict. The charter should be revised to more clearly define which crimes and which actors are eligible for amnesty. Additionally, Article 46, which penalizes discussion and independent investigation of those crimes, should be repealed unconditionally.

5. STATISTICS AND INDICATORS

World Bank Institute Governance Indicators 2005	Algeria Score	Key
Voice and Accountability	24.6	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak voice and accountability; higher value indicates strong voice and account)
Political Stability and Absence of Violence	17.9	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak political stability and high violence; higher value indicates opposite)
Government Effectiveness	42.6	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak government effectiveness; higher value indicates strong govt. effectiveness)
Regulatory Quality	26.2	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak regulatory quality; higher value indicates strong regulatory quality)
Rule of Law	31.9	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak rule of law; higher value indicates strong rule of law)
Control of Corruption	42.4	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak control of corruption; higher value indicates strong control of corruption)

⁴³ Ibid.

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Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2007	Algeria Score	Key
Political Rights	6	Range 1-7 (Lower value indicates good system of political rights; higher value indicates bad system political rights)
Civil Liberties	5	Range 1-7 (Lower value indicates good system of political rights; higher value indicates bad system political rights)
Status	NF	3 Categories: F (Free); PF (Partly Free); NF (Not Free) / (*) Indicates electoral system

Freedom House: Freedom of the Press 2006	Algeria Score	Key
Total Score	61	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates total free press; higher value indicates less freedom) / 3 Categories: F (Free); PF (Partly Free); NF (Not Free)

Countries at the Crossroads 2005	Algeria Score	Key
Accountability and Public Voice	2.90	Range 0-7 (Lower value indicates weak accountability and public voice; higher value indicates strong acc. and p.v.)
Civil Liberties	2.90	Range 0-7 (Lower value indicates weak civil liberties; higher value indicates strong civil liberties)
Rule of Law	2.49	Range 0-7 (Lower value indicates weak rule of law; higher value indicates strong rule of law)
Anticorruption and Transparency	2.55	Range 0-7 (Lower value indicates weak anticorruption and transparency; higher value indicates strong a-c and transp.)

Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006	Algeria Score	Key
Stateness	7.0	Range 0-10 (Lower value indicates negative democratic development; higher value indicates positive democratic development)
Political Participation	4.3	
Rule of Law	4.3	
Stability of Democratic Institutions	2.0	
Political and Social Integration	3.7	
Total Score Political Transformation	4.23	Range 0-10 (Lower value indicates negative democratic development; higher value indicates positive democratic development) / Arrow shows trend in democratic development (↑ Improved; ↓ Worsened)
Total Score Political Management	3.63	Range 0-10 (Lower value indicates lower quality of political management; higher value indicates higher quality of political management)

Corruption Perceptions Index 2006	Algeria Score	Key
Total Score	3.1	Range 0-10 (lower value indicates high corruption; higher value indicates lower values of corruption)

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6. SOURCES

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