

HAITI

1. PRESENTATION¹

Basic Facts ²	
Name of Country	Republic of Haiti (Haiti)
Capital	Port-Au-Prince
Population	8,308,504 (July 2006)
Area	27,750 sq km
Average Life Expectancy	53.23 years (2006 estimate)
Ethnic Groups	Black 95%, mulatto and white 5%
GDP per capita, PPP	\$1,700 (2005 est.)

Community of Democracies	
Previous participation	Participant (Warsaw 2000); Observer (Seoul 2002); Observer (Santiago 2005)

Timeline of Recent Major Events in Haiti:

- 1971** - Jean-Claude Duvalier takes over the presidency upon death of his father.
- 1986** – President Duvalier deposed by a popular uprising.
- 1987** – Constitution ratified by popular referendum.
- 1988** – Leslie Manigat becomes president after controversial elections.
- 1988** – Leslie Manigat overthrown by the military.
- 1990** - Jean-Bertrand Aristide is elected president.
- 1991** - A coup led by Brig. Gen. Raoul Cedras deposes Aristide.
- 1994** - U.S. troops help return Aristide to power.
- 1996** – Raoul Preval elected President.
- 1999** – Preval declares that Parliament’s term has expired and that he will rule by decree.
- 2000** - Aristide is re-elected president, with 91.5% of the vote.
- 2003** – Missions by the OAS and CARICOM attempt to broker a deal between Aristide and the opposition.
- 2003** – Rebellion of “Cannibal Army” starts in Gonaives province.
- 2004** - Rebels march on Port-au-Prince. Aristide flees into exile. Interim Government of Haiti set up. Multilateral Interim Force (MIF), then UN Assistance Mission to Haiti set up (MINUSTAH).
- 2006** – Raoul Preval elected President in long-delayed elections.

¹ Principal author: Democracy Coalition Project

² Source: CIA World Factbook at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>, accessed on July 26, 2006.

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2. BACKGROUND

Despite its historic legacy as the second oldest independent country in the Americas and the first black republic in the world, Haiti has had a turbulent and painful history of dictatorships, weak institutions, coups, and political violence. It is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, and also holds the dubious record of having the lowest life expectancy and highest infant mortality rate in the region.³ According to surveys, 48% of the population eats only one meal a day.⁴ Since the end of the Duvalier dictatorships in the late 1980s, Haiti has seen some fitful but troubled efforts at greater democratization, marked by a series of international interventions.

Former President Aristide returned to power in 2000 in an atmosphere of political stalemate and growing lawlessness, with armed gangs and political militias becoming ever more prevalent, and the opposition refusing to accept the outcome of the 2000 presidential election. International mediation by the Organization of American States (OAS) during 2002 and 2003 between Aristide and the opposition did not yield any improvement in the security situation or any agreement on new elections.

In the autumn of 2003, a gang of anti-Aristide rebels started an uprising in Gonaives which began to spread through the country. In late February 2004, as the rebellion was closing in on Port-au-Prince, Aristide resigned and fled into exile. The lack of clarity surrounding the events of February 2004 has led some observers to allege that Aristide was forced to resign and flee into exile by foreign intervention; indeed, Aristide himself has claimed that the US had a role in his ouster.⁵ An Interim Government of Haiti (IGOH) was formed after Aristide's resignation, which soon asked for, and obtained, an international peacekeeping presence to stabilize the situation. A Multilateral Interim Force (MIF) authorized by the UN Security Council and led by the United States and France arrived in Haiti.

A transitional arrangement towards fully functioning democratic institutions and security was worked out, whereby a UN force, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) would assist the IGOH prepare for elections and assist the Haiti National Police (PNH) in restoring security. In June 2006, the UN Security Council authorized an increase in MINUSTAH's troop strength to deal with increasing security challenges.

Presidential elections were held in February 2006, in which former President Rene Preval fell short of achieving a majority of votes in the first round, triggering a second round. Riots and protests amid allegations of fraud led the Electoral Council to distribute the high number of blank ballots among the various candidates, giving Preval the required majority to win the first round. Legislative elections for the Parliament and

³ Freedom House (2005).

⁴ Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano (2006) p8.

⁵ 'Aristide: US forced me to leave' *BBC News* (2 March 2004) at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3524273.stm>, accessed on September 14, 2006; see also, Younge, G 'The Ouster of Democracy' *The Guardian* (8 March 2004) at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Columnists/Column/0,,1164436,00.html>, accessed on 14 September 2006.

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Senate in February and April 2006 were more peaceful; no party gained an outright majority, but Preval's party, *Lespwa*, came in first. Preval's previous term in office, from 1996 to 2000, had been controversial due to his decision to declare an end to Parliament's term in 1999, deciding to rule by decree.⁶

After the 2004 crisis, international engagement in Haiti increased. In July 2006, an international donors' conference in Port-au-Prince including countries and international financial institutions pledged \$750 million for Haitian reconstruction, more than what the government of Haiti had asked for.

Despite the engagement of the international community, Haiti faces challenges to the most basic elements of democratic government and statehood. The ongoing security situation is very serious: armed and criminal gangs undermine the institutional credibility of the state through their continued defiance and control of certain areas. The state's institutional capacity has at times shown itself incapable of absorbing international aid, obstructing international efforts to put the country on its feet.

3. ANALYSIS

Democratic Institutions

After two years of rule by the unelected Interim Government of Haiti, which succeeded more than four years of contested government by President Aristide and his Fanmi Lavalas (FL) party, the people of Haiti were able to elect their own government again in 2006. The long-delayed elections of 2006 marked a return to a rudimentary functioning of democratic institutions in a multi-party system. However, severe problems remain in the functioning of democratic government.

Constitution and Institutions

Haiti's Constitution provides for a President and a National Assembly composed of a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate, elected by universal suffrage. The government is chaired by a Prime Minister. Multiple political parties exist and contested elections in 2006. However, from the resignation of President Aristide until the elections of February 2006, the country was governed by an unelected Interim Government. Despite the controversy over the nature of Aristide's resignation, the Interim Government came to power through constitutionally legitimate procedures; when President Aristide resigned, he was succeeded by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Boniface Alexandre, as provided for in the Constitution.

⁶ 'Profile: Rene Preval' *BBC News* (16 February 2006) at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4718966.stm>, accessed on November 14, 2006.

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Elections

The elections of 2006, promised and planned by the IGOH after it succeeded President Aristide, were marked by a number of problems, but have nonetheless been seen as successful in returning Haiti to the path of democratization.

The elections for President, initially planned for November and December 2005, were re-scheduled a number of times, increasing popular anxiety.⁷ The first round of the elections was finally held on February 7, 2006, the day on which, according to the Constitution, a new President was to be inaugurated. The delays, changes in schedule, as well as problems with registration and other processes, have led observers to criticize the functioning of the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP). The Haitian human rights organization *Reseau National des Droits de l'Homme* (RNDDH) wrote that the CEP “ruined the credibility of its members and displayed its inability correctly to organize elections”.⁸ According to Amnesty International, the elections raised “serious concerns over the capability of the interim government and the Provisional Electoral Council ... to organize the elections according to international standards”.⁹

The controversies and doubts regarding the CEP foreshadowed some of the problems that occurred during the Presidential election itself, on February 7, 2006. The day went peacefully, and was marked by a high turnout. However, the vote count was marked by violent demonstrations and controversy after a number of burnt ballot papers were discovered in a garbage collection facility near Port-au-Prince. While initial results showed *Lespwa* candidate Rene Preval heading for a first round victory with more than 50% of the vote, when blank ballots were included in the total count it seemed likely that a run-off round would be necessary.¹⁰ In crisis meetings, the CEP decided to address the rising violence and anger at the election count by exploiting a loophole in Haiti’s electoral law regarding blank ballots. The CEP decided to distribute the blank ballots in proportion to the percentages obtained by the various candidates. This gave Preval the requisite amount of votes to avoid a run-off, and an escalation of violence was avoided.

While runner-up candidate Leslie Manigat, who had received 12% of the vote, spoke of a coup through the ballot box, analyses suggest that it was not an illegal move, since Haiti’s electoral law was silent on the distribution of blank ballots.¹¹ Even though the move was not technically illegal, it raised some questions about the due process of elections. The RNDDH criticized the outcome, stating that Preval was elected without the necessary majority required by the Constitution and legislation.¹² According to some commentators, the episode illustrated the need for better election legislation.¹³ It is also

⁷ Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano (2006) p3.

⁸ RNDDH (2006) p22.

⁹ Amnesty International (2006).

¹⁰ UN Security Council (2006) p2; Observers suggest that the number of blank ballots obtained in the election (4.36%) was unusually high for a country like Haiti. See Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano (2006) pp5-6.

¹¹ UN Security Council (2006) p2; Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano (2006) pp5-6.

¹² RNDDH (2006) p23.

¹³ Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano (2006) p6.

possible that the tension and violence surrounding the Presidential election could have been avoided if the CEP's handling of the preparations for the election had been more efficient, and had not resulted in numerous delays in the electoral process.

The second round of the Parliamentary election was delayed as well, and pushed back until April 2006. This round of voting was less controversial, but was marked by a low turnout of 20%.¹⁴ The results saw a strong showing for Preval's *Lespwa* party, but denied it a majority.

After his election, President-elect Preval engaged in a dialogue with members of the opposition and other social and political forces on a new long-term governance and development plan for Haiti. The new institutions started functioning in the late spring, when the new Parliament and Senate convened on May 30, 2006, to approve Jacques Edouard Alexis as the new Prime Minister. A multi-party coalition government was formed, containing representatives from seven different parties, including President Aristide's old party. In his actions so far, President Preval seems to have engaged with members of the opposition and a number of different political groupings, a welcome attitude given Haiti's polarized political system.¹⁵

Rule of Law

Haiti faces major challenges in the administration of the rule of law, and impunity, even for severe abuses, is widespread. Whilst the problems of organized crime, gang violence, drug trafficking, and human trafficking are notable, a basic lack of capacity in the administration of the rule of law hinders the fight against these various security threats. The Haiti National Police (PNH) and the national judiciary face problems ranging from weak capabilities to actual complicity in major human rights abuses and organized crime.

The Judiciary

Judicial institutions and judges are hampered by the legacy of decades of misrule, the effects of violence, and poverty. Many of the courts were destroyed in the violence that led to President Aristide's departure in March 2004.¹⁶ There is a shortage of qualified and well-trained judicial personnel, worsened by a lack of basic training for judges and the precarious situation in which judges find themselves.¹⁷ Even though judges are, by law, required to have a degree in law or a diploma from the National Magistrates School, this requirement is, in practice, not always met.¹⁸ The National Magistrates School closed after only three years of operation in 2004. Many judges have achieved their position through political appointment, and some have an insufficient or very poor level of

¹⁴ 'Haitians vote for new Parliament' (22 April 2006) at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4929610.stm> (accessed on 1 August 2006).

¹⁵ UN Security Council (2006) p3.

¹⁶ International Crisis Group (January 31, 2007) p1.

¹⁷ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2005) p62.

¹⁸ International Crisis Group, (January 31, 2007), p2.

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education.¹⁹ A draft law concerning the School of Magistrates has still not been passed.²⁰ Basic supplies, office materials, and office space are often lacking or insufficient.²¹ The independent expert of the UN Commission on Human Rights points out that some major appeals courts have not been in operation since the violence of 2004.²² Little or no protection is provided to investigating magistrates working on sensitive human rights cases, and a history of impunity for those who attack magistrates creates a climate of fear for the judiciary.²³ According to Freedom House, the judiciary works with “outdated” legal codes, and insists on working in French, the language of a minority of the population.²⁴

At the same time, corruption in the judiciary occurs as well, undermining its independence. RNDDH argues that detainees are routinely freed upon the payment of a bribe to the investigating magistrate.²⁵ Political interference is suspected as well. The decision by the *Court de Cassation* (Supreme Court) to overturn the convictions of a number of people previously convicted of crimes under the Raoul Cedras regime was received with outrage. The interim government’s attempt to “retire” a number of judges from the *Court de Cassation* was seen as a transparent effort to create a more pliant judiciary.²⁶ Concerns also exist regarding the internal governance of the judiciary. The *Conseil supérieur du pouvoir judiciaire* (High Council for the Judiciary), established by decree in December 2005 has been criticized as susceptible to executive influence.²⁷

The Haitian National Police (PNH)

The PNH is the main security force in Haiti, and is meant to work alongside the MINUSTAH peacekeeping forces to ensure order and the rule of law.²⁸ However, the PNH, like the judiciary, faces critical problems. PNH members are sometimes complicit in crimes and human rights abuses themselves, and face little accountability for their actions. Where there is will to enforce the law and punish human rights abuses, the PNH is often faced with severe shortages in capacity and experience. The PNH lacks the necessary procedures, command and control arrangements, and equipment to make an impact upon the acute security problems that Haiti faces; but above all, it is understaffed. Assessments suggest that Haiti would require a national police force of about 24, 000 officers; instead it only has between 3, 000 and 5, 000 officers.²⁹

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ UN Security Council (2006) p5.

²¹ Ibid. p59.

²² Commission on Human Rights (2006) p11.

²³ Ibid. p60-61.

²⁴ Freedom House (2005).

²⁵ RNDDH (2006) p17.

²⁶ Commission on Human Rights (2006) p14.

²⁷ UN Security Council (2006) p5.

²⁸ The armed forces were abolished by President Aristide to prevent future coup attempts.

²⁹ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2006) pp35-38. There are no reliable and precise numbers for how many PNH officers there are.

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In carrying out their tasks, PNH officials are sometimes guilty of excessive use of force and other abuses. A notable abuse carried out by PNH officers took place at a football stadium at Martissant in August 2005, where PNH officers allegedly shot and killed 10 civilians during a confrontation.³⁰ There are reported incidents of extortion, bribery, beatings, and torture carried out by officers of the PNH.³¹

There are some indications of progress, though. The appointment of Mario Andresol as Director-General of the PNH, and his approach towards the PNH, have been welcomed by human rights monitors.³² Director-General Andresol has expressed his will to tighten vetting procedures for applicants to PNH, as well as his attitude of zero tolerance toward human rights abuses within the PNH.³³ PNH senior management, led by Andresol, is putting together a comprehensive reform plan for the force.³⁴ In a move of significant symbolism, the PNH decided to investigate and charge those members of the PNH responsible for excessive force at the Martissant football stadium, as an example of accountability. However, according to the UN Secretary-General, the outcome of the investigation was not satisfactory, as the responsible officers for PNH operations in Martissant were released from detention.³⁵ Furthermore, cooperation between the PNH and UN police units in MINUSTAH has been increasing; the two forces have undertaken more frequent raids into previously lawless, gang-dominated areas of Port-au-Prince.³⁶

Freedom from arbitrary detention, cruel or inhumane punishment

The weakness and corruption in both the PNH and the judiciary only compound the problems in detention and the corrections system. In this area there are significant issues of arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention without trial, political prisoners, torture, and imprisonment in inhumane conditions.

Arbitrary Arrest and Preventive Detention

The arbitrary arrest of citizens is common, and often accompanies excessively violent PNH actions. PNH officers frequently ignore standard arrest procedures, detaining people on unspecified charges.³⁷

Various human rights organizations concur in arguing that the abuse of pretrial detention is one of the biggest human rights problems facing Haiti. The vast majority of detainees in Haitian prisons are awaiting trial, and many of them are held beyond the legal limit for detention before trial. According to the RNDDH, in June 2006, only 542 prisoners out of 3,940 had been convicted, and the rest were being held under “prolonged

³⁰ Ibid. p23; RNDDH (2006) p17.

³¹ RNDDH (2006) p17.

³² Amnesty International (2006); Commission on Human Rights (2006) p10; State Department (2006).

³³ UN Security Council (2006) p4.

³⁴ UN Security Council (2006) p5.

³⁵ UN Security Council (2006) p6.

³⁶ ‘UN Force, Haitian Police carrying out joint effort to eradicate gangs’ *Radio Galaxie* (September 15, 2006) through BBC Media Monitoring, through www.nexis.com.

³⁷ State Department (2006).

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preventive detention”. From September 2004 to June 2006, Haiti’s prison population effectively tripled, rising from 1,340 to 3,940.³⁸ The enlarged prison population is leading the authorities to increasingly use police station cells for extended periods of pre-trial detention.³⁹ The Commission on Human Rights’ expert quotes similar figures in support of his criticism of the “scandalous” situation of extended pre-trial detention in Haiti.⁴⁰ While extensive use of pre-trial detention powers occurs in all penitentiary centers, reports indicate that more than 85% of inmates at the National Penitentiary could be pre-trial detainees.⁴¹ Since May 2005, the government has taken a more pro-active approach to tackling the rule of law crisis in Haiti, by aiming to expedite the court cases of those who had suffered prolonged pre-trial detention.⁴²

Political Prisoners

A number of detainees are political figures, often closely associated with former President Aristide, which has led to claims that they are being kept for political reasons. Two public figures associated with the Lavalas party and known to be Aristide sympathizers were arrested and charged in 2005: Father Gerard Jean-Juste, a Catholic priest who is suffering from leukemia, and Annette Auguste (“So Anne”), a community organizer.⁴³ The Human Rights Commission’s independent expert argues that even though these two persons have been charged, the charges have not been substantiated. The persistent detention beyond the limits imposed by law “tends to confer a political dimension on such extended pretrial detentions”.⁴⁴ The case of a former prime minister under Aristide, Yvon Neptune, is also cited. Neptune was arrested in June 2004 and it is alleged that he did not see a judge until May 2005; only in September 2005 was he indicted for his role in the La Scierie killings.⁴⁵ Neptune started a hunger strike, protesting the indictment as politically motivated, and went into critical condition.⁴⁶ However, international pressure on the Haitian government built up, and in July 2006, Neptune was freed for humanitarian reasons.⁴⁷

Torture and Conditions in Prisons

There are allegations that government authorities, notably the PNH, use torture and excessive force against prisoners.⁴⁸ The RNDDH has reported on particularly notorious centers of abuse, such as the Carrefour “Omega” police station, where prisoners were found with evidence of beatings and abuse.⁴⁹ Judicial investigations into torture

³⁸ RNDDH (2006) p14.

³⁹ UN Security Council (2006) 5.

⁴⁰ Commission on Human Rights (2006) p11.

⁴¹ International Crisis Group (January 31, 2007) p3.

⁴² State Department (2006).

⁴³ Id..

⁴⁴ Commission on Human Rights (2006) p12.

⁴⁵ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2006) p70.

⁴⁶ ‘How Haiti’s Future May Depend on a Starving Prisoner’ (16 June 2005) *The New York Times*, p3.

⁴⁷ ‘Haiti Ex-PM Freed From Prison’ (28 July 2006) *BBC News Online* at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5223484.stm>, accessed on August 2, 2006.

⁴⁸ See for instance Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2006) pp43-44.

⁴⁹ Quoted in State Department (2006).

allegations have not made any progress.⁵⁰ Prisoners are often kept in unhygienic and overcrowded conditions, due to the fact that some prisons and police stations were not rebuilt after the 2004 violence, while arrests have been increasing.⁵¹

Freedom of the Press

Whilst the media are generally free and protected by law, the climate of violence and impunity hurts journalists' ability to carry out their work freely. Reports indicate that journalists practice a degree of self-censorship out of a fear of violent retribution.⁵² The PNH occasionally harasses journalists, and has been known to shoot journalists during raids on gangs.⁵³ In July 2005, prominent television and print journalist Jacques Roche was murdered by unknown gunmen in what is considered a politically-motivated crime.⁵⁴

4. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

While the successful completion of elections as well as President Preval's inclusive approach is a sign of progress for Haiti's democratic institutions, it is too early to say what path the country will take in the post-Aristide period. Since democratically-elected institutions have only been operating since the spring of 2006, it would be unsatisfactory to rely on the record of the anomalous Interim Government of Haiti to make this sort of assessment.

Furthermore, even if we were to rely on the record of the interim government, there are some notable human rights problems, especially in the rule of law, which cannot be avoided. As the Amnesty International 2006 country report for Haiti summarizes, there seems to be "no effective system to administer justice, uphold the rule of law and provide impartial protection of human rights". This reality raises hard questions about Haiti's status as a democracy.⁵⁵

Furthermore, the irregularities and problems that surrounded the elections of 2006 suggest that a mechanism as intrinsic to democratic rule as the electoral process may be a real challenge for the Haitian state to administer. The numerous delays and irregularities, as well as the handling of the electoral crisis of February 2006, suggest that the administration of elections is in need of significant improvement.

Following on from some of the major issues discussed in this report, three main areas require reform and improvement so as to put Haiti on the path of increased democratization and respect for human rights, and the strengthening of its institutional capacity to tackle the daunting problem of insecurity and violence. As was demonstrated

⁵⁰ Id. .

⁵¹ Id.

⁵² State Department (2006); Freedom House (2005); Amnesty International (2006).

⁵³ State Department (2006).

⁵⁴ Human Rights Watch (2006) p200.

⁵⁵ Amnesty International (2006).

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by the 2006 elections, the continued existence of armed gangs and the basic lack of security can pose a direct challenge to the democratic process.

Firstly, the government of Haiti should pursue root and branch reform of the PNH. The government and its international partners should continue to support Director-General Andresol's praiseworthy efforts to mold the PNH into a professional, accountable, and capable national security force. An independent human rights commission for the PNH could be established, as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the International Crisis Group have both called for.⁵⁶ At the same time, the need for accountable policing needs to be balanced with the need to establish basic order and the rule of law. Increasing the size of the PNH to a level appropriate to the size of Haiti and to its problems should be a priority of the government and its international partners. Human rights standards should be at the center of professional training programs for PNH officers, to avoid the excessive use of force, abusive treatment of civilians and other problems for which the PNH has become known. A PNH that is more respectful of people's basic rights and dignity will be a police force that is more effective, as it will be able to rely on the people's support in fighting crime and violence.

The reform of the PNH needs to go hand in hand with efforts to strengthen the judiciary, and to relieve the crisis of pre-trial detentions, the second area that needs to be improved. It might be necessary, as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights recommends, to set up an expedited detention review process that would take the pressure off the judiciary by reducing the number of preventive pre-trial detentions.⁵⁷ The International Crisis Group has also proposed various measures, such as the creation of a special criminal court with international assistance, to strengthen the judiciary's capacity.⁵⁸

Efforts to tackle the PNH and the judiciary need to be accompanied by a determined effort to complete disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) for those militias and groups still at large in Haiti. These groups have posed and will continue to pose a threat to the basic credibility of the state's capacity to control the "monopoly of violence".

The role of MINUSTAH and the international community could be crucial in the last three tasks; indeed, President Preval himself has called for a reorientation of MINUSTAH's mission and goals towards security sector reform and strengthening the judiciary.⁵⁹ In this regard, the UN Secretary-General's request for an increase in MINUSTAH's police forces and corrections officers is a step in the right direction.⁶⁰ Only a long-term commitment will help Haiti develop a steady democratic process.

⁵⁶ State Department (2006).

⁵⁷ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2006) p97.

⁵⁸ International Crisis Group (January 31, 2007) p 13.

⁵⁹ UN Security Council (2006) p2.

⁶⁰ UN Security Council (2006) p20

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Lastly, the government of Haiti must tackle the problem of its electoral laws and institutions. The Organization of American States' Electoral Observatory has suggested that the government reassess the question of how Haiti's electoral laws deal with the issue of "blank votes". The Observatory's report argues that blank ballots are perhaps not appropriate for emerging democratic societies, since they can be confusing to a poorly educated citizenry with little experience of democratic practice.⁶¹ Haiti should improve its electoral legislation to clarify whether and how exactly blank votes are to be allocated. Furthermore, the government of Haiti, and its international partners, should invest significant resources in improving the operation and staffing of the electoral institutions. Haiti cannot afford to go through the delays and irregularities it saw in 2005-2006 again.

5. STATISTICS AND INDICATORS

World Bank Institute Governance Indicators 2005	Haiti Score	Key
Voice and Accountability	10.1	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak voice and accountability; higher value indicates strong voice and account)
Political Stability and Absence of Violence	3.8	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak political stability and high violence; higher value indicates opposite)
Government Effectiveness	5.3	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak government effectiveness; higher value indicates strong govt. effectiveness)
Regulatory Quality	11.9	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak regulatory quality; higher value indicates strong regulatory quality)
Rule of Law	1.9	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak rule of law; higher value indicates strong rule of law)
Control of Corruption	1	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak control of corruption; higher value indicates strong control of corruption)

Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2007	Haiti Score	Key
Political Rights	4	Range 1-7 (Lower value indicates good system of political rights; higher value indicates bad system political rights)
Civil Liberties	5	Range 1-7 (Lower value indicates good system of civil liberties; higher value indicates bad system civil liberties)
Status	PF	3 Categories: F (Free); PF (Partly Free); NF (Not Free) / (*) Indicates electoral system

Freedom House: Freedom of the Press 2006	Haiti Score	Key
Total Score	66 NF	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates total free press; higher value indicates less freedom) / 3 Categories: F (Free); PF (Partly Free); NF (Not Free)

⁶¹ Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano (2006) p6.

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Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006	Haiti Score	Key
Stateness	5.0	Range 0-10 (Lower value indicates negative democratic development; higher value indicates positive democratic development)
Political Participation	3.8	
Rule of Law	3.0	
Stability of democratic Institutions	2.0	
Political and Social Integration	3.0	Range 0-10 (Lower value indicates negative democratic development; higher value indicates positive democratic development) / Arrow shows trend in democratic development (↑Improved; ↓Worsened)
Total Score Political Transformation	3.35	
Total Score Political Management	2.84	Range 0-10 (Lower value indicates lower quality of political management; higher value indicates higher quality of political management)

Corruption Perceptions Index 2006	Haiti Score	Key
Total Score	1.8	Range 0-10 (lower value indicates high corruption; higher value indicates lower values of corruption)

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